John Locke
http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/l/locke/john/l81s/index.html
Preface
1. Chapter I.
2. Of the State of Nature.
3. Of the State of War.
4. Of Slavery.
5. Of Property.
6. Of Paternal Power.
7. Of Political or Civil Society.
8. Of the Beginning of Political Societies.
9. Of the Ends of Political Society and Government.
10. Of the Forms of a Common-wealth.
11. Of the Extent of the Legislative Power.
12. Of the Legislative, Executive, and Federative Power of
the Common-wealth.
13. Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common-wealth.
14. Of Prerogative.
15. Of Paternal, Political, and Despotical Power, considered
together.
16. Of Conquest.
17. Of Usurpation.
18. Of Tyranny.
19. Of the Dissolution of Government.
Chapter II -- Of the State
of Nature.
Sect. 4. TO understand political
power right, and derive it from its original, we must consider, what state all
men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit,
within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon
the will of any other man.
A state also of equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank, promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another, and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by
nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all
question, that he makes it the foundation of that obligation to mutual love
amongst men, on which he builds the duties they owe one another, and from
whence he derives the great maxims of justice and charity. ...
Sect. 6. But though this be a
state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license: though man in that state
have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he
has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his
possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it.
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one:
and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it,
that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life,
health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent,
and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, sent into
the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose
workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's pleasure: and
being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature,
there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us
to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve
himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his
own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice on an
offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of
the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be
restrained from invading others rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and
the law of nature be observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all
mankind, the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every
man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that
law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would,
as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if there were no
body that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law, and thereby
preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And if any one in the state of
nature may punish another for any evil he has done, every one may do so: for in
that state of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one over another, what any may do in prosecution of that law,
every one must needs have a right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of
nature, one man comes by a power over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary
power, to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the
passionate heats, or boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to
retribute to him, so far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is
proportionate to his transgression, which is so much as may serve for
reparation and restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may
lawfully do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing
the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than
that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set to the
actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes dangerous to
mankind, the tie, which is to secure them from injury and violence, being
slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass against the whole species,
and the peace and safety of it, provided for by the law of nature, every man
upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may
restrain, or where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may
bring such evil on any one, who hath transgressed that law, as may make him
repent the doing of it, and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from
doing the like mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, every man hath
a right to punish the offender, and be executioner of the Law of Nature.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will
seem a very strange doctrine to some men: but before they condemn it, I desire
them to resolve me, by what right any prince or state can put to death, or
punish an alien, for any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their
laws, by virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the
legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they did, is
he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which they are in
force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power over him. Those who
have the supreme power of making laws in England, France or Holland, are to an
Indian, but like the rest of the world, men without authority: and therefore,
if by the law of nature every man hath not a power to punish offences against
it, as he soberly judges the case to require, I see not how the magistrates of
any community can punish an alien of another country; since, in reference to
him, they can have no more power than what every man naturally may have over
another. ...
Sect. 13. To this strange
doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature every one has the executive power of
the law of nature, I doubt not but it will be objected, that it is unreasonable
for men to be judges in their own cases, that self-love will make men partial
to themselves and their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature,
passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence
nothing but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.
I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences
of the state of nature, which must certainly be great, where men may be judges
in their own case, since it is easy to be imagined, that he who was so unjust
as to do his brother an injury, will scarce be so just as to condemn himself
for it: but I shall desire those who make this objection, to remember, that absolute
monarchs are but men; and if government is to be the remedy of those evils,
which necessarily follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the
state of nature is therefore not to how much better it is than the state of
nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be judge in
his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he pleases, without the
least liberty to any one to question or control those who execute his pleasure
and in whatsoever he cloth, whether led by reason, mistake or passion, must be
submitted to much better it is in the state of nature, wherein men are not
bound to submit to the unjust will of another: and if he that judges, judges
amiss in his own, or any other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of
mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a
mighty objection, where are, or ever were there any men in such a state of
nature? To which it may suffice as an answer at present, that since all princes
and rulers of independent governments all through the world, are in a state of
nature, it is plain the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of
men in that state. I have named all governors of independent communities,
whether they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact
that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of
agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body
politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and yet
still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for truck, &c.
between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by Garcilasso de la Vega,
in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an Indian, in the woods of
America, are binding to them, though they are perfectly in a state of nature,
in reference to one another: for truth and keeping of faith belongs to men, as
men, and not as members of society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there
were never any men in the state of nature, I will not only oppose the authority
of the judicious Hooker, Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says, The laws
which have been hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men
absolutely, even as they are men, although they have never any settled
fellowship, never any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to
do: but forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves
with competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth
desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those defects
and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by ourselves, we
are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with others: this was
the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in politic societies. But I
moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in that state, and remain so, till
by their own consents they make themselves members of some politic society; and
I doubt not in the sequel of this discourse, to make it very clear. ...
Chapter V -- Of Property.
Sec. 25. Whether we consider
natural reason, which tells us, that men, being once born, have a right to
their preservation, and consequently to meat and drink, and such other things
as nature affords for their subsistence: or revelation, which gives us an account
of those grants God made of the world to Adam, and to Noah, and his sons, it is
very clear, that God, as king David says, Psal. cxv. 16. has given the earth to
the children of men; given it to mankind in common. But this being supposed, it
seems to some a very great difficulty, how any one should ever come to have a
property in any thing: I will not content myself to answer, that if it be
difficult to make out property, upon a supposition that God gave the world to
Adam, and his posterity in common, it is impossible that any man, but one
universal monarch, should have any property upon a supposition, that God gave
the world to Adam, and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of
his posterity. But I shall endeavour to show, how men might come to have a
property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common, and that
without any express compact of all the commoners.
Sec. 26. God, who hath given the
world to men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the
best advantage of life, and convenience. The earth, and all that is therein, is
given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And tho' all the
fruits it naturally produces, and beasts it feeds, belong to mankind in common,
as they are produced by the spontaneous hand of nature; and no body has
originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind, in any of
them, as they are thus in their natural state: yet being given for the use of
men, there must of necessity be a means to appropriate them some way or other,
before they can be of any use, or at all beneficial to any particular man. The
fruit, or venison, which nourishes the wild Indian, who knows no enclosure, and
is still a tenant in common, must be his, and so his, i.e. a part of him, that
another can no longer have any right to it, before it can do him any good for
the support of his life.
Sec. 27. Though the earth, and all
inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his
own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labor of his body,
and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath
mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature
hath placed it in, it hath by this labor something annexed to it, that excludes
the common right of other men: for this labor being the unquestionable property
of the laborer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to,
at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.
Sec. 28. He that is nourished by
the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees
in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. No body can deny but
the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he
digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or
when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not
his, nothing else could. That labor put a distinction between them and common:
that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had
done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say, he had no
right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because he had not the
consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to
himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was
necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We
see in commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of
what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which
begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of
this or that part, does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners.
Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I
have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others,
become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labor
that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed
my property in them.
Sec. 29. By making an explicit
consent of every commoner, necessary to any one's appropriating to himself any
part of what is given in common, children or servants could not cut the meat,
which their father or master had provided for them in common, without assigning
to every one his peculiar part. Though the water running in the fountain be
every one's, yet who can doubt, but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it
out? His labor hath taken it out of the hands of nature, where it was common,
and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby appropriated it to
himself.
Sec. 30. Thus this law of reason
makes the deer that Indian's who hath killed it; it is allowed to be his goods,
who hath bestowed his labor upon it, though before it was the common right of
every one. And amongst those who are counted the civilized part of mankind, who
have made and multiplied positive laws to determine property, this original law
of nature, for the beginning of property, in what was before common, still
takes place; and by virtue thereof, what fish any one catches in the ocean,
that great and still remaining common of mankind; or what ambergrise any one
takes up here, is by the labor that removes it out of that common state nature
left it in, made his property, who takes that pains about it. And even amongst
us, the hare that any one is hunting, is thought his who pursues her during the
chase: for being a beast that is still looked upon as common, and no man's
private possession; whoever has employed so much labor about any of that kind,
as to find and pursue her, has thereby removed her from the state of nature,
wherein she was common, and hath begun a property.
Sec. 31. It will perhaps be
objected to this, that if gathering the acorns, or other fruits of the earth,
&c. makes a right to them, then any one may ingross as much as he will. To
which I answer, Not so. The same law of nature, that does by this means give us
property, does also bound that property too. God has given us all things
richly, 1 Tim. vi. 12. is the voice of reason confirmed by inspiration. But how
far has he given it us? To enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any
advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property
in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.
Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy. And thus, considering the
plenty of natural provisions there was a long time in the world, and the few
spenders; and to how small a part of that provision the industry of one man
could extend itself, and ingross it to the prejudice of others; especially
keeping within the bounds, set by reason, of what might serve for his use;
there could be then little room for quarrels or contentions about property so
established.
Sec. 32. But the chief matter of
property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on
it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in and carries with it all the
rest; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former.
As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the
product of, so much is his property. He by his labor does, as it were, enclose
it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else
has an equal title to it; and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot
enclose, without the consent of all his fellow-commoners, all mankind. God,
when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labor,
and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason
commanded him to subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life, and
therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labor. He that in
obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it,
thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no
title to, nor could without injury take from him.
Sec. 33. Nor was this
appropriation of any parcel of land, by improving it, any prejudice to any
other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet
unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for
others because of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all. No body could
think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good
draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst:
and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the
same.
Sec. 34. God gave the world to men
in common; but since he gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest
conveniences of life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed
he meant it should always remain common and uncultivated. He gave it to the use
of the industrious and rational, (and labor was to be his title to it;) not to
the fancy or covetousness of the quarrelsome and contentious. He that had as
good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain,
ought not to meddle with what was already improved by another's labor: if he
did, it is plain he desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no
right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common with others to
labor on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more
than he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.
Sec. 35. It is true, in land that
is common in England, or any other country, where there is plenty of people
under government, who have money and commerce, no one can enclose or appropriate
any part, without the consent of all his fellow commoners; because this is left
common by compact, i.e. by the law of the land, which is not to be violated.
And though it be common, in respect of some men, it is not so to all mankind;
but is the joint property of this country, or this parish. Besides, the
remainder, after such enclosure, would not be as good to the rest of the
commoners, as the whole was when they could all make use of the whole; whereas
in the beginning and first peopling of the great common of the world, it was
quite otherwise. The law man was under, was rather for appropriating. God
commanded, and his wants forced him to labor. That was his property which could
not be taken from him where-ever he had fixed it. And hence subduing or cultivating
the earth, and having dominion, we see are joined together. The one gave title
to the other. So that God, by commanding to subdue, gave authority so far to
appropriate: and the condition of human life, which requires labor and
materials to work on, necessarily introduces private possessions.
Sec. 36. The measure of property
nature has well set by the extent of men's labor and the conveniences of life:
no man's labor could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his enjoyment
consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this
way, to entrench upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property,
to the prejudice of his neighbor, who would still have room for as good, and as
large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it was
appropriated. This measure did confine every man's possession to a very
moderate proportion, and such as he might appropriate to himself, without
injury to any body, in the first ages of the world, when men were more in
danger to be lost, by wandering from their company, in the then vast wilderness
of the earth, than to be straitened for want of room to plant in. And the same
measure may be allowed still without prejudice to any body, as full as the
world seems: for supposing a man, or family, in the state they were at first
peopling of the world by the children of Adam, or Noah; let him plant in some
inland, vacant places of America, we shall find that the possessions he could
make himself, upon the measures we have given, would not be very large, nor,
even to this day, prejudice the rest of mankind, or give them reason to
complain, or think themselves injured by this man's encroachment, though the
race of men have now spread themselves to all the corners of the world, and do
infinitely exceed the small number was at the beginning. Nay, the extent of
ground is of so little value, without labor, that I have heard it affirmed,
that in Spain itself a man may be permitted to plough, sow and reap, without
being disturbed, upon land he has no other title to, but only his making use of
it. But, on the contrary, the inhabitants think themselves beholden to him,
who, by his industry on neglected, and consequently waste land, has increased
the stock of corn, which they wanted. But be this as it will, which I lay no
stress on; this I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.)
that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in
the world, without straitening any body; since there is land enough in the world
to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the
tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger
possessions, and a right to them; which, how it has done, I shall by and by show
more at large.
Sec. 37. This is certain, that in
the beginning, before the desire of having more than man needed had altered the
intrinsic value of things, which depends only on their usefulness to the life
of man; or had agreed, that a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep
without wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of flesh, or a whole
heap of corn; though men had a right to appropriate, by their labor, each one
of himself, as much of the things of nature, as he could use: yet this could
not be much, nor to the prejudice of others, where the same plenty was still
left to those who would use the same industry. To which let me add, that he who
appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen, but increase the
common stock of mankind: for the provisions serving to the support of human
life, produced by one acre of enclosed and cultivated land, are (to speak much
within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land
of an equal richness lying waste in common. And therefore he that encloses
land, and has a greater plenty of the conveniences of life from ten acres, than
he could have from an hundred left to nature, may truly be said to give ninety
acres to mankind: for his labor now supplies him with provisions out of ten acres,
which were but the product of an hundred lying in common. I have here rated the
improved land very low, in making its product but as ten to one, when it is
much nearer an hundred to one: for I ask, whether in the wild woods and
uncultivated waste of America, left to nature, without any improvement, tillage
or husbandry, a thousand acres yield the needy and wretched inhabitants as many
conveniences of life, as ten acres of equally fertile land do in Devonshire,
where they are well cultivated?
Before the appropriation of land,
he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed, as many of
the beasts, as he could; he that so employed his pains about any of the
spontaneous products of nature, as any way to alter them from the state which nature
put them in, by placing any of his labor on them, did thereby acquire a
propriety in them: but if they perished, in his possession, without their due
use; if the fruits rotted, or the venison putrified, before he could spend it,
he offended against the common law of nature, and was liable to be punished; he
invaded his neighbor's share, for he had no right, farther than his use called
for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life.
Sec. 38. The same measures
governed the possession of land too: whatsoever he tilled and reaped, laid up
and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his peculiar right; whatsoever he
enclosed, and could feed, and make use of, the cattle and product was also his.
But if either the grass of his enclosure rotted on the ground, or the fruit of
his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the earth,
notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be looked on as waste, and might be
the possession of any other. Thus, at the beginning, Cain might take as much
ground as he could till, and make it his own land, and yet leave enough to
Abel's sheep to feed on; a few acres would serve for both their possessions.
But as families increased, and industry enlarged their stocks, their possessions
enlarged with the need of them; but yet it was commonly without any fixed
property in the ground they made use of, till they incorporated, settled
themselves together, and built cities; and then, by consent, they came in time,
to set out the bounds of their distinct territories, and agree on limits
between them and their neighbors; and by laws within themselves, settled the
properties of those of the same society: for we see, that in that part of the
world which was first inhabited, and therefore like to be best peopled, even as
low down as Abraham's time, they wandered with their flocks, and their herds,
which was their substance, freely up and down; and this Abraham did, in a
country where he was a stranger. Whence it is plain, that at least a great part
of the land lay in common; that the inhabitants valued it not, nor claimed
property in any more than they made use of. But when there was not room enough
in the same place, for their herds to feed together, they by consent, as
Abraham and Lot did, Gen. xiii. 5. separated and enlarged their pasture, where
it best liked them. And for the same reason Esau went from his father, and his
brother, and planted in mount Seir, Gen. xxxvi. 6.
Sec. 39. And thus, without
supposing any private dominion, and property in Adam, over all the world,
exclusive of all other men, which can no way be proved, nor any one's property
be made out from it; but supposing the world given, as it was, to the children
of men in common, we see how labor could make men distinct titles to several
parcels of it, for their private uses; wherein there could be no doubt of
right, no room for quarrel.
Sec. 40. Nor is it so strange, as
perhaps before consideration it may appear, that the property of labor should
be able to over-balance the community of land: for it is labor indeed that puts
the difference of value on every thing; and let any one consider what the
difference is between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar, sown with
wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land lying in common, without any
husbandry upon it, and he will find, that the improvement of labor makes the
far greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very modest computation
to say, that of the products of the earth useful to the life of man nine tenths
are the effects of labor: nay, if we will rightly estimate things as they come
to our use, and cast up the several expences about them, what in them is purely
owing to nature, and what to labor, we shall find, that in most of them
ninety-nine hundredths are wholly to be put on the account of labor.
Sec. 41. There cannot be a clearer
demonstration of any thing, than several nations of the Americans are of this,
who are rich in land, and poor in all the comforts of life; whom nature having
furnished as liberally as any other people, with the materials of plenty, i.e.
a fruitful soil, apt to produce in abundance, what might serve for food,
raiment, and delight; yet for want of improving it by labor, have not one
hundredth part of the conveniences we enjoy: and a king of a large and fruitful
territory there, feeds, lodges, and is clad worse than a day-laborer in
England.
Sec. 42. To make this a little
clearer, let us but trace some of the ordinary provisions of life, through
their several progresses, before they come to our use, and see how much they
receive of their value from human industry. Bread, wine and cloth, are things
of daily use, and great plenty; yet notwithstanding, acorns, water and leaves,
or skins, must be our bread, drink and cloathing, did not labor furnish us with
these more useful commodities: for whatever bread is more worth than acorns,
wine than water, and cloth or silk, than leaves, skins or moss, that is wholly
owing to labor and industry; the one of these being the food and raiment which
unassisted nature furnishes us with; the other, provisions which our industry
and pains prepare for us, which how much they exceed the other in value, when
any one hath computed, he will then see how much labor makes the far greatest
part of the value of things we enjoy in this world: and the ground which
produces the materials, is scarce to be reckoned in, as any, or at most, but a
very small part of it; so little, that even amongst us, land that is left
wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting,
is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount
to little more than nothing.
This shows how much numbers of men
are to be preferred to largeness of dominions; and that the increase of lands,
and the right employing of them, is the great art of government: and that
prince, who shall be so wise and godlike, as by established laws of liberty to
secure protection and encouragement to the honest industry of mankind, against
the oppression of power and narrowness of party, will quickly be too hard for
his neighbors: but this by the by. To return to the argument in hand,
Sec. 43. An acre of land, that
bears here twenty bushels of wheat, and another in America, which, with the
same husbandry, would do the like, are, without doubt, of the same natural
intrinsic value: but yet the benefit mankind receives from the one in a year,
is worth 5l. and from the other possibly not worth a penny, if all the profit
an Indian received from it were to be valued, and sold here; at least, I may
truly say, not one thousandth. It is labor then which puts the greatest part of
value upon land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing: it is to
that we owe the greatest part of all its useful products; for all that the
straw, bran, bread, of that acre of wheat, is more worth than the product of an
acre of as good land, which lies waste, is all the effect of labor: for it is
not barely the plough-man's pains, the reaper's and thresher's toil, and the
baker's sweat, is to be counted into the bread we eat; the labor of those who
broke the oxen, who digged and wrought the iron and stones, who felled and
framed the timber employed about the plough, mill, oven, or any other utensils,
which are a vast number, requisite to this corn, from its being feed to be sown
to its being made bread, must all be charged on the account of labor, and
received as an effect of that: nature and the earth furnished only the almost
worthless materials, as in themselves. It would be a strange catalogue of
things, that industry provided and made use of, about every loaf of bread,
before it came to our use, if we could trace them; iron, wood, leather, bark,
timber, stone, bricks, coals, lime, cloth, dying drugs, pitch, tar, masts,
ropes, and all the materials made use of in the ship, that brought any of the
commodities made use of by any of the workmen, to any part of the work; all
which it would be almost impossible, at least too long, to reckon up.
Sec. 44. From all which it is
evident, that though the things of nature are given in common, yet man, by
being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or
labor of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property; and that,
which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of
his being, when invention and arts had improved the conveniences of life, was
perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.
Sec. 45. Thus labor, in the
beginning, gave a right of property, wherever any one was pleased to employ it
upon what was common, which remained a long while the far greater part, and is
yet more than mankind makes use of. Men, at first, for the most part, contented
themselves with what unassisted nature offered to their necessities: and though
afterwards, in some parts of the world, (where the increase of people and
stock, with the use of money, had made land scarce, and so of some value) the
several communities settled the bounds of their distinct territories, and by
laws within themselves regulated the properties of the private men of their
society, and so, by compact and agreement, settled the property which labor and
industry began; and the leagues that have been made between several states and
kingdoms, either expresly or tacitly disowning all claim and right to the land
in the others possession, have, by common consent, given up their pretences to
their natural common right, which originally they had to those countries, and
so have, by positive agreement, settled a property amongst themselves, in
distinct parts and parcels of the earth; yet there are still great tracts of
ground to be found, which (the inhabitants thereof not having joined with the
rest of mankind, in the consent of the use of their common money) lie waste,
and are more than the people who dwell on it do, or can make use of, and so
still lie in common; tho' this can scarce happen amongst that part of mankind
that have consented to the use of money. ...
Sec. 49. Thus in the beginning all
the world was America, and more so than that is now; for no such thing as money
was any where known. Find out something that hath the use and value of money
amongst his neighbors, you shall see the same man will begin presently to
enlarge his possessions. ...
Sec. 51. And thus, I think, it is
very easy to conceive, without any difficulty, how labor could at first begin a
title of property in the common things of nature, and how the spending it upon
our uses bounded it. So that there could then be no reason of quarrelling about
title, nor any doubt about the largeness of possession it gave. Right and
convenience went together; for as a man had a right to all he could employ his
labor upon, so he had no temptation to labor for more than he could make use
of. This left no room for controversy about the title, nor for encroachment on
the right of others; what portion a man carved to himself, was easily seen; and
it was useless, as well as dishonest, to carve himself too much, or take more
than he needed. ...
Chapter VII -- Of Political
or Civil Society.
Sec. 77. GOD having made man such a creature, that in his own judgment, it was not good for him to be alone, put him under strong obligations of necessity, convenience, and inclination to drive him into society, as well as fitted him with understanding and language to continue and enjoy it. The first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came to be added: and though all these might, and commonly did meet together, and make up but one family, wherein the master or mistress of it had some sort of rule proper to a family; each of these, or all together, came short of political society, as we shall see, if we consider the different ends, ties, and bounds of each of these.
Sec. 78. Conjugal society is made
by a voluntary compact between man and woman; and tho' it consist chiefly in
such a communion and right in one another's bodies as is necessary to its chief
end, procreation; yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance, and a
communion of interests too, as necessary not only to unite their care and
affection, but also necessary to their common off-spring, who have a right to
be nourished, and maintained by them, till they are able to provide for
themselves.
Sec. 79. For the end of
conjunction, between male and female, being not barely procreation, but the
continuation of the species; this conjunction betwixt male and female ought to
last, even after procreation, so long as is necessary to the nourishment and
support of the young ones, who are to be sustained even after procreation, so
long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones, who are
to be sustained by those that got them, till they are able to shift and provide
for themselves. This rule, which the infinite wise maker hath set to the works
of his hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey. In those viviparous
animals which feed on grass, the conjunction between male and female lasts no
longer than the very act of copulation; because the teat of the dam being
sufficient to nourish the young, till it be able to feed on grass, the male
only begets, but concerns not himself for the female or young, to whose
sustenance he can contribute nothing. But in beasts of prey the conjunction
lasts longer: because the dam not being able well to subsist herself, and
nourish her numerous off-spring by her own prey alone, a more laborious, as
well as more dangerous way of living, than by feeding on grass, the assistance
of the male is necessary to the maintenance of their common family, which
cannot subsist till they are able to prey for themselves, but by the joint care
of male and female. The same is to be observed in all birds, (except some
domestic ones, where plenty of food excuses the cock from feeding, and taking
care of the young brood) whose young needing food in the nest, the cock and hen
continue mates, till the young are able to use their wing, and provide for
themselves.
Sec. 80. And herein I think lies
the chief, if not the only reason, why the male and female in mankind are tied
to a longer conjunction than other creatures, viz. because the female is
capable of conceiving, and de facto is commonly with child again, and brings
forth too a new birth, long before the former is out of a dependency for
support on his parents help, and able to shift for himself, and has all the
assistance is due to him from his parents: whereby the father, who is bound to
take care for those he hath begot, is under an obligation to continue in
conjugal society with the same woman longer than other creatures, whose young
being able to subsist of themselves, before the time of procreation returns
again, the conjugal bond dissolves of itself, and they are at liberty, till
Hymen at his usual anniversary season summons them again to chose new mates.
Wherein one cannot but admire the wisdom of the great Creator, who having given
to man foresight, and an ability to lay up for the future, as well as to supply
the present necessity, hath made it necessary, that society of man and wife
should be more lasting, than of male and female amongst other creatures; that
so their industry might be encouraged, and their interest better united, to
make provision and lay up goods for their common issue, which uncertain
mixture, or easy and frequent solutions of conjugal society would mightily
disturb.
Sec. 81. But tho' these are ties
upon mankind, which make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man, than
the other species of animals; yet it would give one reason to enquire, why this
compact, where procreation and education are secured, and inheritance taken
care for, may not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time,
or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compacts, there
being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that it
should always be for life; I mean, to such as are under no restraint of any
positive law, which ordains all such contracts to be perpetual.
Sec. 82. But the husband and wife,
though they have but one common concern, yet having different understandings,
will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too; it therefore being
necessary that the last determination, i. e. the rule, should be placed
somewhere; it naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the
stronger. But this reaching but to the things of their common interest and
property, leaves the wife in the full and free possession of what by contract
is her peculiar right, and gives the husband no more power over her life than
she has over his; the power of the husband being so far from that of an
absolute monarch, that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from
him, where natural right, or their contract allows it; whether that contract be
made by themselves in the state of nature, or by the customs or laws of the
country they live in; and the children upon such separation fall to the father
or mother's lot, as such contract does determine.
Sec. 83. For all the ends of
marriage being to be obtained under politic government, as well as in the state
of nature, the civil magistrate cloth not abridge the right or power of either
naturally necessary to those ends, viz. procreation and mutual support and
assistance whilst they are together; but only decides any controversy that may
arise between man and wife about them. If it were otherwise, and that absolute
sovereignty and power of life and death naturally belonged to the husband, and
were necessary to the society between man and wife, there could be no matrimony
in any of those countries where the husband is allowed no such absolute
authority. But the ends of matrimony requiring no such power in the husband,
the condition of conjugal society put it not in him, it being not at all
necessary to that state. Conjugal society could subsist and attain its ends
without it; nay, community of goods, and the power over them, mutual assistance
and maintenance, and other things belonging to conjugal society, might be
varied and regulated by that contract which unites man and wife in that
society, as far as may consist with procreation and the bringing up of children
till they could shift for themselves; nothing being necessary to any society,
that is not necessary to the ends for which it is made.
Sec. 84. The society betwixt
parents and children, and the distinct rights and powers belonging respectively
to them, I have treated of so largely, in the foregoing chapter, that I shall
not here need to say any thing of it. And I think it is plain, that it is far
different from a politic society.
Sec. 85. Master and servant are
names as old as history, but given to those of far different condition; for a
freeman makes himself a servant to another, by selling him, for a certain time,
the service he undertakes to do, in exchange for wages he is to receive: and
though this commonly puts him into the family of his master, and under the
ordinary discipline thereof; yet it gives the master but a temporary power over
him, and no greater than what is contained in the contract between them. But
there is another sort of servants, which by a peculiar name we call slaves, who
being captives taken in a just war, are by the right of nature subjected to the
absolute dominion and arbitrary power of their masters. These men having, as I
say, forfeited their lives, and with it their liberties, and lost their
estates; and being in the state of slavery, not capable of any property, cannot
in that state be considered as any part of civil society; the chief end whereof
is the preservation of property.
Sec. 86. Let us therefore consider
a master of a family with all these subordinate relations of wife, children,
servants, and slaves, united under the domestic rule of a family; which, what
resemblance soever it may have in its order, offices, and number too, with a
little common-wealth, yet is very far from it, both in its constitution, power
and end: or if it must be thought a monarchy, and the paterfamilias the
absolute monarch in it, absolute monarchy will have but a very shattered and
short power, when it is plain, by what has been said before, that the master of
the family has a very distinct and differently limited power, both as to time
and extent, over those several persons that are in it; for excepting the slave
(and the family is as much a family, and his power as paterfamilias as great,
whether there be any slaves in his family or no) he has no legislative power of
life and death over any of them, and none too but what a mistress of a family
may have as well as he. And he certainly can have no absolute power over the
whole family, who has but a very limited one over every individual in it. But
how a family, or any other society of men, differ from that which is properly political
society, we shall best see, by considering wherein political society itself
consists.
Sec. 87. Man being born, as has
been proved, with a title to perfect freedom, and an uncontrolled enjoyment of
all the rights and privileges of the law of nature, equally with any other man,
or number of men in the world, hath by nature a power, not only to preserve his
property, that is, his life, liberty and estate, against the injuries and
attempts of other men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that law in
others, as he is persuaded the offence deserves, even with death itself, in
crimes where the heinousness of the fact, in his opinion, requires it. But
because no political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the
power to preserve the property, and in order thereunto, punish the offences of
all those of that society; there, and there only is political society, where
every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigned it up into
the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for
protection to the law established by it. And thus all private judgment of every
particular member being excluded, the community comes to be umpire, by settled
standing rules, indifferent, and the same to all parties; and by men having
authority from the community, for the execution of those rules, decides all the
differences that may happen between any members of that society concerning any
matter of right; and punishes those offences which any member hath committed against
the society, with such penalties as the law has established: whereby it is easy
to discern, who are, and who are not, in political society together. Those who
are united into one body, and have a common established law and judicature to
appeal to, with authority to decide controversies between them, and punish
offenders, are in civil society one with another: but those who have no such
common appeal, I mean on earth, are still in the state of nature, each being,
where there is no other, judge for himself, and executioner; which is, as I
have before showed it, the perfect state of nature.
Sec. 88. And thus the
common-wealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the
several transgressions which they think worthy of it, committed amongst the
members of that society, (which is the power of making laws) as well as it has
the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members, by any one that is
not of it, (which is the power of war and peace;) and all this for the
preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is
possible. But though every man who has entered into civil society, and is
become a member of any commonwealth, has thereby quitted his power to punish
offences, against the law of nature, in prosecution of his own private
judgment, yet with the judgment of offences, which he has given up to the
legislative in all cases, where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given a
right to the common-wealth to employ his force, for the execution of the judgments
of the common-wealth, whenever he shall be called to it; which indeed are his
own judgments, they being made by himself, or his representative. And herein we
have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society,
which is to judge by standing laws, how far offences are to be punished, when
committed within the common-wealth; and also to determine, by occasional
judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries
from without are to be vindicated; and in both these to employ all the force of
all the members, when there shall be need.
Sec. 89. Where-ever therefore any
number of men are so united into one society, as to quit every one his
executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public, there and
there only is a political, or civil society. And this is done, where-ever any
number of men, in the state of nature, enter into society to make one people,
one body politic, under one supreme government; or else when any one joins
himself to, and incorporates with any government already made: for hereby he
authorizes the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make
laws for him, as the public good of the society shall require; to the execution
whereof, his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men
out of a state of nature into that of a common-wealth, by setting up a judge on
earth, with authority to determine all the controversies, and redress the
injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth; which judge is the
legislative, or magistrates appointed by it. And where-ever there are any
number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal
to, there they are still in the state of nature.
Sec. 90. Hence it is evident, that absolute monarchy, which by some men is counted the only government in the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil-government at all: for the end of civil society, being to avoid, and remedy those inconveniences of the state of nature, which necessarily follow from every man's being judge in his own case, by setting up a known authority, to which every one of that society may appeal upon any injury received, or controversy that may arise, and which every one of the society ought to obey; where-ever any persons are, who have not such an authority to appeal to, for the decision of any difference between them, there those persons are still in the state of nature; and so is every absolute prince, in respect of those who are under his dominion. ...
Chapter VIII -- Of the
Beginning of Political Societies.
Sec. 95. MEN being, as has been
said, by nature, all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of
this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own
consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty,
and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join
and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living
one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater
security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do,
because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in
the liberty of the state of nature. When any number of men have so consented to
make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and
make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude
the rest.
Sec. 96. For when any number of
men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have
thereby made that community one body, with a power to act as one body, which is
only by the will and determination of the majority: for that which acts any
community, being only the consent of the individuals of it, and it being necessary
to that which is one body to move one way; it is necessary the body should move
that way whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the
majority: or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body, one
community, which the consent of every individual that united into it, agreed
that it should; and so every one is bound by that consent to be concluded by
the majority. And therefore we see, that in assemblies, impowered to act by
positive laws, where no number is set by that positive law which impowers them,
the act of the majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course
determines, as having, by the law of nature and reason, the power of the whole.
Sec. 97. And thus every man, by
consenting with others to make one body politic under one government, puts
himself under an obligation, to every one of that society, to submit to the
determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it; or else this original
compact, whereby he with others incorporates into one society, would signify
nothing, and be no compact, if he be left free, and under no other ties than he
was in before in the state of nature. For what appearance would there be of any
compact? what new engagement if he were no farther tied by any decrees of the society,
than he himself thought fit, and did actually consent to? This would be still
as great a liberty, as he himself had before his compact, or any one else in
the state of nature hath, who may submit himself, and consent to any acts of it
if he thinks fit.
Sec. 98. For if the consent of the
majority shall not, in reason, be received as the act of the whole, and
conclude every individual; nothing but the consent of every individual can make
any thing to be the act of the whole: but such a consent is next to impossible
ever to be had, if we consider the infirmities of health, and avocations of
business, which in a number, though much less than that of a common-wealth,
will necessarily keep many away from the public assembly. To which if we add
the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interests, which unavoidably happen
in all collections of men, the coming into society upon such terms would be
only like Cato's coming into the theatre, only to go out again. Such a
constitution as this would make the mighty Leviathan of a shorter duration,
than the feeblest creatures, and not let it outlast the day it was bom in:
which cannot be supposed, till we can think, that rational creatures should
desire and constitute societies only to be dissolved: for where the majority
cannot conclude the rest, there they cannot act as one body, and consequently
will be immediately dissolved again.
Sec. 99. Whosoever therefore out
of a state of nature unite into a community, must be understood to give up all
the power, necessary to the ends for which they unite into society, to the
majority of the community, unless they expressly agreed in any number greater
than the majority. And this is done by barely agreeing to unite into one
political society, which is all the compact that is, or needs be, between the
individuals, that enter into, or make up a commonwealth. And thus that, which
begins and actually constitutes any political society, is nothing but the
consent of any number of freemen capable of a majority to unite and incorporate
into such a society. And this is that, and that only, which did, or could give
beginning to any lawful government in the world.
Sec. 100. To this I find two
objections made.
First, That there are no instances
to be found in story, of a company of men independent, and equal one amongst
another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government.
Secondly, It is impossible of
right, that men should do so, because all men being born under government, they
are to submit to that, and are not at liberty to begin a new one.
[Refutations of these objections
follow] ...
Sec. 119. Every man being, as has
been showed, naturally free, and nothing being able to put him into subjection
to any earthly power, but only his own consent; it is to be considered, what
shall be understood to be a sufficient declaration of a man's consent, to make
him subject to the laws of any government. There is a common distinction of an
express and a tacit consent, which will concern our present case. No body doubts
but an express consent, of any man entering into any society, makes him a
perfect member of that society, a subject of that government. The difficulty
is, what ought to be looked upon as a tacit consent, and how far it binds, i.e.
how far any one shall be looked on to have consented, and thereby submitted to
any government, where he has made no expressions of it at all. And to this I
say, that every man, that hath any possessions, or enjoyment, of any part of
the dominions of any government, cloth thereby give his tacit consent, and is
as far forth obliged to obedience to the laws of that government, during such
enjoyment, as any one under it; whether this his possession be of land, to him
and his heirs for ever, or a lodging only for a week; or whether it be barely
travelling freely on the highway; and in effect, it reaches as far as the very
being of any one within the territories of that government.
Sec. 120. To understand this the
better, it is fit to consider, that every man, when he at first incorporates
himself into any commonwealth, he, by his uniting himself thereunto, annexed
also, and submits to the community, those possessions, which he has, or shall
acquire, that do not already belong to any other government: for it would be a
direct contradiction, for any one to enter into society with others for the
securing and regulating of property; and yet to suppose his land, whose
property is to be regulated by the laws of the society, should be exempt from
the jurisdiction of that government, to which he himself, the proprietor of the
land, is a subject. By the same act therefore, whereby any one unites his
person, which was before free, to any common-wealth, by the same he unites his
possessions, which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them,
person and possession, subject to the government and dominion of that
common-wealth, as long as it hath a being. Whoever therefore, from thenceforth,
by inheritance, purchase, permission, or otherways, enjoys any part of the
land, so annexed to, and under the government of that common-wealth, must take
it with the condition it is under; that is, of submitting to the government of
the common-wealth, under whose jurisdiction it is, as far forth as any subject
of it.
Sec. 121. But since the government
has a direct jurisdiction only over the land, and reaches the possessor of it,
(before he has actually incorporated himself in the society) only as he dwells
upon, and enjoys that; the obligation any one is under, by virtue of such
enjoyment, to submit to the government, begins and ends with the enjoyment; so
that whenever the owner, who has given nothing but such a tacit consent to the
government, will, by donation, sale, or otherwise, quit the said possession, he
is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other common-wealth; or to
agree with others to begin a new one, in vacuis locis, in any part of the
world, they can find free and unpossessed: whereas he, that has once, by actual
agreement, and any express declaration, given his consent to be of any
commonwealth, is perpetually and indispensably obliged to be, and remain
unalterably a subject to it, and can never be again in the liberty of the state
of nature; unless, by any calamity, the government he was under comes to be
dissolved; or else by some public act cuts him off from being any longer a
member of it.
Sec. 122. But submitting to the laws of any country, living quietly, and enjoying privileges and protection under them, makes not a man a member of that society: this is only a local protection and homage due to and from all those, who, not being in a state of war, come within the territories belonging to any government, to all parts whereof the force of its laws extends. But this no more makes a man a member of that society, a perpetual subject of that common-wealth, than it would make a man a subject to another, in whose family he found it convenient to abide for some time; though, whilst he continued in it, he were obliged to comply with the laws, and submit to the government he found there. And thus we see, that foreigners, by living all their lives under another government, and enjoying the privileges and protection of it, though they are bound, even in conscience, to submit to its administration, as far forth as any denison; yet do not thereby come to be subjects or members of that commonwealth. Nothing can make any man so, but his actually entering into it by positive engagement, and express promise and compact. This is that, which I think, concerning the beginning of political societies, and that consent which makes any one a member of any commonwealth.